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MARK COLYVAN* 
Environmental ethics concerns itself with ethical issues arising from 
humans' relationship with their natural environment. Of particular 
interest are ethical considerations in relation to human efforts to 
conserve the natural environment. Some of the key environmental 
ethics issues are whether environmental value is intrinsic or 
instrumental, whether biodiversity is valuable in itself or whether 
it is an indicator of some other value(s), and what the appropriate 
time scale is for conservation planning. But there is much more to 
environmental philosophy than environmental ethics. For a start, 
environmental philosophy covers a whole raft of issues in philosophy 
of science such as the role of mathematical models in population 
ecology,1 the relationship between the stability of ecosystems and the 
complexity of those ecosystems/ the representation and treatment 
of uncertainty in ecological and conservation biology applications,3 
and whether ecology has laws.4 None of these issues has anything 
to do with ethics. But there is another sense in which environmental 
philosophy is much broader than environmental ethics: even in 
relation to topics where there are value or ethical issues, there are other 
philosophical issues that we would do well to disentangle from the 
ethics. I would argue that it is a mistake to think of the philosophical 
issues in question as merely environmental ethics. 
I will argue for this conclusion by way of some examples. I will 
consider a few places where environmental ethics might be thought to 
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be impurtant fur decisiuns about conserving our natural environment. 
I will show that philosophy has much more to contribute to the topics 
in question than what might properly be thought of as environmental 
ethics, and, what is more, it is hard to see how progress can be made 
on the problems in question without invoking the extra philosophical 
resources I am suggesting (primarily philosophy of science, 
epistemology, and decision theory). 
Also, by way of introduction, I should draw attention to the style of 
philosophy I am engaging in here. Most of the work I will be discussing 
in this paper is the product of interdisciplinary, collaborative research 
teams who publish in both philosophy and science journals and 
are interested in pursuing philosophical problems that are of direct 
relevance to scientists working in the areas in question. Moreover, 
the problems in question are approached by bringing philosophical 
expertise to bear on them, but this is done from within the scientific 
enterprise. There is no so-called' first philosophy', where philosophers 
sit back in the armchair and contemplate science from a privileged 
vantage point outside science. The approach I will adopt here in 
this paper (and the approach adopted by my team of postdoctoral 
fellows and postgraduate students working here at the University of 
Sydney) is one where the philosophy always engages with the science: 
the original problems come from science, the solutions are typically 
sought by way of collaborations between scientists and philosophers, 
and the solutions arrived at must be scientifically acceptable and 
are often published in science journals.s The work addressed in this 
paper can thus be thought to be an example of what my colleague 
Paul Griffiths calls 'Biohumanities'.6 
Hypothesis Testing 
I will start with a place where philosophy is turning out to be very 
useful in environmental science: hypothesis testing. This is not 
a topic traditionally thought of as falling within the purview of 
environmental ethics but, as we will see, there are some important 
questions of value tied up in hypothesis testing and these could very 
easily be overlooked unless we are open to the idea of environmental 
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philosophy going beyond environmental ethics. The extra-ethical 
philosophy in this case is philosophy of statistics and confirmation 
theory. 
The standard model of hypothesis testing has us compare an 
alternative hypothesis ('there is some effect') with the null hypothesis 
('there is no effect'). We then need to consider the evidence and 
see how our two hypotheses stack up in light of the evidence. The 
standard assumption is that accepting the alternative hypothesis when 
there is no effect (a talse positive or type-l error) is worse than failing 
to reject the null hypothesis when there is an effect (a false negative 
or type-II error). The test is thus designed so that the probability 
of type-I error is low. (This probability is called a and is typically 
arbitrarily set at 0.05.) The experimenter then tries to minimise the 
probability of type-II error (the probability of which is called ~). This 
is very standard scientific practice, not just in environmental science, 
but elsewhere as well. 
It is clear that in many contexts, type-I error is much worse than 
type-II error. For example, from a certain, broadly liberal point of 
view, convicting an innocent person (false positive) is worse than 
failing to convict a guilty person (false negative). And, arguably, there 
are many scientific contexts where this is so as well. But it is far from 
clear that in conservation biology type-I error is always the bad guy. 
Consider the problem of trying to determine the conservation status 
of a particular species-the Eastern Quoll (Dasyurus viverrinus), say. 
Let's suppose we are wondering whether we should upgrade its 
conservation status to 'threatened' (from 'near threatened'). Here the 
type-I error is the error of classifying the QuaIl as threatened when 
it is not, and the type-II error is failing to upgrade its conservation 
status (i.e. leaving it at 'near threatened') when it is in fact threatened. 
From a certain green-sympathetic perspective, at least, it can be 
argued that the dangerous mistake is the type-II error. After all, the 
type-II error would stand in the way of conservation efforts (because 
the Eastern Quoll is not thought to be threatened) and may lead to 
further deleterious effects on its long-term survival prospects. The 
type-I error, on the other hand, does license conservation efforts to 
help the Eastern Quoll's long-term survival. It might be that in the 
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latter case these efforts art:! unnt:!cessary, but they would not do any 
harm. In particular, they would not be as harmful as doing nothing 
when the Eastern Quoll is creeping towards extinction. 
As I pointed out, this line of thought does depend on 'a certain 
green-sympathetic perspective' and so does involve values. But values 
have no place in the objective business of scientific hypothesis testing, 
it might be protested. This, you might think, suggests that we reject 
the above' green' line of argument and stick with the standard model 
of hypothesis testing. But this is to ignore the values entering into 
the picture on the standard model of hypothesis testing. Reverting to 
the standard assumption that type-I error is worse than type-II error 
is also to make a value judgement. These kinds of value judgements 
in science cannot be swept aside; they must be faced up to and ad-
dressed properly. What are the appropriate values to hold here? That's 
the question we need to focus on. Adopting the standard model of 
hypothesis testing and ignoring the value-laden nature of the model 
does not make the business of hypothesis testing more objective.7 
Decision Theory and Triage 
Another place where philosophy has been able to help advance 
debates in environmental science has been in the application of 
decision-theoretic methods in conservation management. Decision 
theory provides us with a way of making decisions in an uncertain 
world and is generally thought to be the theory of rational choice. 
The theory assumes that an agent has a number of actions at her dis-
posal, AI-An' and that the world might be in any number of different 
states, 51-Sm • Outcomes are just an act-state pair: Gjj is the result of the 
agent choosing action A. while the world is in state S. Probabilities, p .. 
I J IJ 
and utilities u are assigned to each outcome O. The expected utility q 1) 
of act Aj is just 
EU(A.) = ~m UkP.k 
I .£...Jk=l I I 
where L~=l Pik = 1 . The decision rule is: choose the action with the 
greatest expected utility, if there is such an action.8 
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So far so good, but what has this got to do with conserving the 
environment? Conservation managers have limited resources to do 
the work required of them. They must make some choices about where 
to spend these resources. One approach would be to use the resources 
on the most pressing problems: captive breeding programs for the 
most endangered animal species, for example. But this advice very 
often flies in the face of the advice of decision theory. Decision theory 
urges us to consider the probability ot success as well as the relevant 
utilities. So even if we assume that there is more benefit in saving 
a critically endangered species than in saving a merely endangered 
species, that does not in itself suggest that the best way to spend the 
limited resources is by trying to save the critically endangered species. 
After all, the chances of success in saving critically endangered 
species is typically rather low. In many circumstances, the best thing 
for the conservation manager to do will be to invest the resources in 
a program directed at species other than the most endangered. This 
approach is well known in medical circles (especially emergency 
departments and war-time military hospitals) and is known as triage. 
It amounts to an assessment of the urgency of the cases and the 
probability of success with each of them. From this it is determined, 
based on sound decision theoretic reasoning or rules of thumb that 
give similar results, the order in which the cases will be dealt with. In 
some circumstances, cases will not be dealt with at all (some critically-
ill patients will be left to die and some critically endangered species 
will be left to proceed to extinction). 
From a decision-theoretic perspective, environmental triage is all 
fairly straight forward and makes good sense. Such environmental 
triage, however, is very controversial. It is not entirely clear why it is 
so controversial, but one possibility is the intrusion of certain ethical 
theories into some people's thinking about these issues. For instance, 
in the medical case, there will be ethical theories that rule against 
leaving a patient to die, even if the chance of saving the patient's 
life is low. Similarly, some ethical theories will rule against leaving a 
species to go extinct, even if the chances of successfully turning things 
around are low. But so much the worse for such ethical intrusions, 
I say. The relevant ethical theories may be well motivated and may 
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even deliver the right results when resources are not limited and 
where there is no uncertainty (i.e. where we know what the result of 
our actions will be). But sadly we do not live in such a world and in 
this, the actual world, such ethical theories are useless. There is still a 
place for ethics in the decision-theoretic framework I'm advocating. 
The place for ethics will be in helping to determine the relevant 
utilities in the decision problem. This is, admittedly, a more modest 
role than some might envisage for ethics in environmental decision 
making, but so be it. To think that ethics alone can tell us what to do 
in an uncertain world is to make a very dangerous mistake: it is to 
confuse ethics with decision theory.9 
The Precautionary Principle 
The precautionary principle is thought to be some over-arching ethical 
principle that advises us not to take chances with the environment. 
When considering some course of action where we are uncertain 
about the outcomes, the precautionary principle tells us not to choose 
actions that may have disastrous consequences. But beyond this 
rather imprecise statement, it is unclear what the principle amounts 
to. It can't simply advise against any course of action with possibly 
disastrous consequences, for that, in effect, rules out every course 
of action-including doing nothing (which, in many environmental 
settings, can result in the most disastrous outcomes). There are many 
questions about this problematic principle: does the precautionary 
principle conflict with standard decision theory?; does it advise 
against the use of standard decision theory?; is it simply the maxi-
min rule, for when the probabilities are not known?;!O how is the 
principle to be implemented in practice? The difficulties encountered 
in providing satisfying answers to these and other questions have led 
some to doubt whether the precautionary principle can provide any 
guidance in environmental decision making. 
Katie Steele!! has recently argued that the precautionary principle is 
best seen as advice about framing environmental decision problems. 
One important aspect of this framing is the separation of the fact and 
value dimensions of a decision problem. On the value side of things, 
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the precautionary principle can be understood as espousing the ideals 
of sustainable development, where this includes a serious commitment 
to public goods and the wellbeing of future generations. On the 
factual side, the precautionary principle gives us guidance about 
what states or consequences of actions are scientifically plausible, and 
thus what is the appropriate way to set up a given decision problem. 
This is, in large part, a scientific issue and involves an appreciation 
of the relevant states, the consequences ot implementing various 
environmental strategies, and the uncertainties in question. It might 
be the case that available evidence is such that we have uncertainties 
about the probabilities in question (so-called metauncertainty) so that 
we can only provide 'ball park' probability assignments to the states 
in the decision problem. Similarly, we might only have uncertainty 
about the utilities and only 'ball park' utility assignments. That is, we 
might not be able to provide precise probabilities/ utilities for each 
outcome, but instead have imprecise probabilities/ utilities (intervals 
in place of single real numbers). In such a situation, standard decision 
theory breaks down, since it depends on a single real number for the 
probabilities / utilities in question. 
There are, however, variants of standard decision theory capable 
of dealing with such scenarios but these variants require the decision 
maker to take a stance on her attitude towards risk: be cautious, gung-
ho, or something in between. In environmental decision-making, 
at least, a strong case can be made for a precautionary attitude in 
the face of metauncertainty and uncertainty about utilities. For 
example, strategy A might be better than strategy B if the unknown 
probabilities / utilities turn out one way, but B might be better than A 
if the unknown probabilities/utilities turn out differently. Here the 
precautionary principle might kick in and advise us to choose the 
strategy that is best for the environment in the worst cases not already 
eliminated. In effect, the precautionary principle amounts to a limited 
application of maxi-min reasoning in cases where metauncertainty or 
uncertainty about utilities prevents a clear answer about the preferred 
action. There is an ethical component to this issue-when setting 
up the problem, err on the side of the environment or sustainable 
development-but, once again, it is not simply ethics. There is a 
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~ignificant contribution being made from (non-slandaH.lj Jecision 
theory and epistemology (in the recognition and treatment of the 
metauncertainty and uncertainty about the utilities). 
Conclusion 
I have outlined a few of the ways in which environmental philosophy 
goes beyond environmental ethics. Environmental philosophy has 
made, and continues to make, contributions towards debates about 
hypothesis testing, the implementation of decision-theoretic methods 
in conservation management, and understanding the application 
and limitations of precautionary reasoning. These are just some 
of the places we might have looked for such contributions. Others 
include the role of diverse committees in environmental decision-
making,12 the scope and limits of biobanking13 and questions about 
the nature of environmental value. 14 In this paper I have argued 
that, treating these extra-ethical, philosophical issues as belonging 
to environmental ethics is not only a misrepresentation of the nature 
of the issues, it is a dangerous mistake. For to ignore these other 
philosophical issues-epistemological and decision theoretic issues, 
for instance-we may fail to avail ourselves of the most appropriate 
tools for dealing with the problems at hand-the various tools of 
epistemology and decision theory, for instance. There is, of course, 
still a role for environmental ethics in all this, but it's a more modest 
role than might have been previously thought. And the role of ethics 
in environmental decision-making needs to be properly understood 
in relation to the relevant epistemology, philosophy of science and 
especially decision theory. IS 
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